On June 28, 2025, President Lazarus Chakwera’s administration officially completed five years in office—an event that has triggered constitutional and legal debate over the legitimacy of the government’s continued stay in power until the next general elections scheduled for September 16, 2025.
Under the 1994 Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, particularly Section 83(1), the term of office for a president is five years, beginning on the date they are sworn into office.
President Chakwera and Vice President Saulos Chilima were sworn in on June 28, 2020, following the historic court-ordered fresh presidential election of that month.
Accordingly, a strict textual reading of the law would suggest that their term constitutionally expired on June 28, 2025.
This raises a fundamental constitutional question: Is the current government operating outside the bounds of its constitutional term from June 29 to September 16, 2025?
There is no explicit clause in the Constitution that authorises the extension of presidential terms beyond the five-year limit in non-emergency, peacetime contexts.
Section 83(1) is clear and unambiguous in stating that “the President shall hold office for five years” and Section 83(2) limits presidential terms to two. There is no mention of an interim period beyond the fifth anniversary.
Furthermore, Section 80(1) states that general elections to the office of the President shall be held every five years, suggesting a strict electoral cycle.
However, Malawi’s electoral calendar was disrupted following the 2020 Constitutional Court judgment which annulled the 2019 elections due to widespread irregularities and ordered fresh elections within 150 days.
The new electoral cycle thus shifted the presidential vote from May (as traditionally held) to June 23, 2020, with inauguration on June 28.
Following this shift, the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) and Parliament have yet to realign the election timetable with the five-year constitutional term, resulting in the upcoming 2025 elections being scheduled for September 16, nearly three months beyond the expiry of the presidential mandate.
This delay creates a legal grey area.
Unlike Parliament, whose mandate may be extended under emergency provisions as per Section 67(1), there is no constitutional provision that allows for an automatic extension of a presidential term.
This implies that from June 29 to September 16, 2025, the executive authority is exercised without a direct constitutional mandate, unless validated by a specific constitutional amendment or court ruling.
In comparative constitutional practice, such transitional arrangements are often addressed through transitional clauses or enabling statutes.
In Kenya, for instance, the Constitution provides that a sitting president shall remain in office until a successor is sworn in—even beyond the five-year term—but only where the successor has already been elected.
In Malawi’s case, no election will have occurred by June 28, raising the question of whether the presidency is now operating on implied power or through unconstitutional extension.
Legal experts and scholars such as Professor Edge Kanyongolo have previously warned about the importance of aligning electoral timetables with constitutional mandates to avoid creating governance vacuums or illegitimacies.
The 2019 MEC versus HRDC Supreme Court ruling also emphasised the supremacy of electoral legitimacy and the importance of adhering to constitutional deadlines, stating that “governance must proceed within the four corners of the Constitution.”
This principle applies squarely to the current situation.
As of July 2025, no court ruling or constitutional amendment has been enacted to validate or regularise the government’s mandate beyond June 28.
This exposes the administration to claims of unconstitutional occupation of office, which may undermine the legitimacy of any decisions, contracts, or appointments made during this period.
Moreover, this legal ambiguity may also trigger questions around the validity of the 2025 elections themselves, since the government overseeing them will be doing so without a valid constitutional mandate.
This could become fertile ground for future legal challenges and electoral disputes.
In light of this, the Malawi Law Society (MLS), legal academics, and civil society organisations must press Parliament and the Judiciary to either issue a constitutional clarification or push for urgent legal reforms to avoid similar crises in future electoral cycles.
Failure to act risks setting a dangerous precedent where constitutional timelines are treated as flexible suggestions rather than binding obligations.
In conclusion, with the presidency having exhausted its constitutional term on June 28, 2025, and no legal framework in place to justify the extension to September 16, the current administration is arguably operating without constitutional legitimacy.
This development is not merely symbolic; it strikes at the heart of Malawi’s constitutional democracy, where adherence to the rule of law is the foundation of state power.
Unless remedied through lawful means, the situation presents a dangerous precedent for term manipulation and erosion of democratic accountability.
